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Abstract
The levying of VAT in countries of the European Union creates significant distortions
for local authorities in their decision-making on public provision and contracting out of
public services. In several EU-countries, a refund of VAT to local governments
eliminates this effect. Therefore, these schemes facilitate contracting out by local
governments. In European countries with a refund scheme for the VAT costs of local
governments or other ways to solve this distortion, contracting out refuse collection is
relatively high compared to countries without. Moreover, the design of the scheme may
have an effect on the tax rates of the included government sectors. A closed system
financed by local governments only will lead to an increase of local tax rates.
71. Introduction
Over the last two decades, contracting out of government services has increased. A
broad field of studies has shown that this policy generates efficiency gains because
private sector companies can be more efficient than public sector companies in
activities such as refuse collection, fire protection and cleaning services (Domberger
and Jensen, 1997; Tang, 1997). Although competition for service contracts will lead to
lower expenditure and higher efficiency, competition itself generates new problems as
transaction costs, taxation issues and rent seeking (Boyne, 1998). As will be shown, the
levying of VAT in the European Union influences decision-making on public provision
versus contracting out. Consequently, the VAT regime for countries in the EU favours
public provision over contracting out and public sector bodies are not able to achieve
the maximal efficiency gains. Several countries in Europe have introduced schemes to
dissolve this distortion (Aujean, Jenkins and Poddar, 1999).
In this paper, the different VAT refund schemes of the relevant countries are described
with their main characteristics. As the VAT refund lowers the consumers price of
contracting out, the VAT refund schemes have a positive effect on the outsourcing of
local authorities and may, therefore, generate efficiency gains. Besides, the design of
the scheme may have consequences for the tax rates of the included public sector
bodies. There seems to be evidence that for European countries with a refund of the
VAT costs, or a fiscal solution to the distortionary VAT effects, out of house refuse
collection is relatively high compared to countries without these solutions.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the economic effects for local
governments of contracting out their services. In section 3, the effect of the levying of
VAT on the decision-making process by local governments is described. In sections 4
and 5, an overview is given of the different VAT refund schemes in Europe intended to
solve the distortionary effects of VAT. Section 6 offers the conclusions based on the
analysis.
2. The economic effects of contracting out
There seems to be evidence that contracting out government services saves taxpayers
money, relative to public provision. In an overview, Domberger and Jensen (1997)
showed that contracting out a broad field of government services suggest cost savings of
about twenty per cent without sacrificing the quality of services provided.
Especially, the cost savings of contracting out refuse collection have been discussed at
length in the existing literature. Kitchen (1976) showed that the average costs are lower
in case of contracting out instead of direct provision by a municipality. Pommerehne
and Frey (1977) studied refuse collection in Switzerland. They showed that the private
sector comes up with lower costs that amounted to 20 per cent, as far as the refuse
8collection market is competitive. Stevens (1978) arrived at a cost decrease between 7
and 30 per cent due to contracting out for the USA, where the magnitude of the effect
depends on the size of the municipality. Based on UK-data, Domberger, Meadowcroft
and Thompson (1986) published a study on the effects of contracting out household
refuse collection in the United Kingdom. They concluded that there are cost savings of
22 per cent for contracting out to private companies. Szymanski and Wilkins (1993) and
Szymanski (1996) confirmed these results, based on an extension (in years) of this
database. Gradus and Dijkgraaf  (1997) showed similar cost savings between 15 and 20
per cent for the Netherlands, in case Dutch municipalities are contracting out refuse
collection. Moreover, Ohlsson (1998) reported almost the same estimations for Sweden.
Recently, Bosch, Predraja and Suarez-Pandiello (2000) presented Spanish data for 73
municipalities in Catalonia. They pointed out that the framework for competition for
which the service is provided could be more relevant than the public private dichotomy.
In a recent contribution Reeves and Barrow (2000) pointed out cost savings of around
45 per cent for Ireland.
Also for other government activities competitive tendering will lead to lower
expenditure and higher efficiency. Tang (1997), in a critical assessment of the existing
literature, came to the conclusion that the private sector is found to be more efficient in
refuse collection, fire protection, cleaning services, and capital intensive waste-water
treatment, while in sectors such as water supply and railways the results are more
mixed.
A related question is the popularity of contracting out of refuse collection. In the United
Kingdom 30 per cent of the contracts for refuse collection is placed out of house
(Szymanski, 1996). In the Netherlands 40 per cent of the municipalities uses private
collectors for refuse. However, because private collectors are especially active in small
villages only 20 per cent of total tonnages is in private hands (Gradus and Dijkgraaf,
1997). According to Reeves and Barrow (2000), in Ireland in 39 per cent of studied
cases private providers was contracted to provide refuse collection. In Denmark 85 per
cent of local authorities relies on private companies for waste collection and disposal
(up from 27 per cent in 1991) (OECD, 2000). In Norway, 73 per cent of the
municipalities makes use of private companies for waste collection and disposal. In
Sweden, the proportion is 63 per cent. In the same study it is shown that for Italy 46 per
cent and for Finland 92 per cent of the municipalities contracts out refuse collection.
Also a recent study by López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) reported on the
track record of local authorities towards contracting out. Based on US data in 1987 and
1992 for 3042 counties for twelve services such as water supply, landfills, libraries etc.
only 25 per cent of the services in 1987 and 35 per cent in 1992 were placed out of
house. Moreover, in this article a nice empirical investigation of the mode of providing
government services is given, where three leading theories (efficiency, political
patronage and ideology) are investigated. The evidence presented in this article
9indicates that state government laws and state laws restricting county spending
encourage contracting out, whereas strong public unions discourage it. This points to
the important roles played by political patronage and taxpayer resistance to government
spending in the privatisation decision.
As already pointed out in the introduction, in EU-countries the fiscal system may also
be an important explanation for the reservation of local authorities towards contracting
out. Table 1 shows the differences in eight European countries’ percentages on
outsourcing of the refuse collection by local authorities.
Table 1 Out of house refuse collection in European countries
Country Percent of out of house refuse
collection
Level playing field
United Kingdom 30 yes2
Ireland 39 no
Netherlands 40 no1
Italy 46 no
Sweden 63 yes2
Norway 73 yes3
Denmark 85 yes3
Finland 92 yes2
1. Current plans are that a VAT refund scheme is available in 2003.
2. The level playing field is realised by the introduction of a VAT refund scheme.
3. The level playing field is realised by considering the collection of household refuse
as a taxable activity.
From this table it can be concluded that a higher percentage of contracting out is
correlated with the existence of a level playing field for refuse collection. In the
countries with a level playing field, this has been generated by the introduction of a
VAT refund scheme or by considering the collection of household refuse as a taxable
activity. As a consequence, the decision-making between self-supply and contracting
out is not influenced by VAT effects. Despite its system of VAT compensation the UK
has a low percentage of contracting out. A possible explanation for this could be that the
data for UK are of earlier date or that contracting out is highly sensitive to ideology and
political patronage.
3. VAT and public sector bodies in Europe
As shown before, local authorities can generate significant efficiency gains by
contracting out their services. In the choice between self-supply and outsourcing of
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services by local authorities, the levying of VAT has a distortionary effect. In case of
self-supply, the local authority has to pay VAT just on the costs on the purchase of
goods and services. The value added of the local authority – such as personnel costs – is
due to the self-supply not raised with VAT. In case of contracting out to a private
enterprise, VAT is charged on the full price. As a result, VAT costs are higher in case of
outsourcing than in case of self-supply. This effect is a consequence of the European
VAT legislation for particular activities of local authorities and certain specified
activities performed by public or private suppliers.
European VAT legislation for public sector bodies distinguishes three types of
activities: taxable activities, non-taxable activities and tax-exempt activities (Aujean,
Jenkins and Poddar, 1999; Dijk and Lubbers, 2000). All activities of both private
suppliers and public sector bodies are in general within the scope of VAT, and are
called taxable activities. There are two exceptions on this general rule. As described in
Article 4(5) of the Sixth VAT-directive, the first exception is made for activities of
public sector bodies engaged in their role as public authority:
States, regional and local government authorities and other bodies governed by public
law shall not be considered taxable persons in respect of the activities or transactions
in which they engage as public authorities, even where they collect dues, fees,
contributions, or payments in connection with these activities or transactions.
However, when they engage in such activities or transactions, they shall be considered
taxable persons in respect of these activities or transactions where treatment as non-
taxable persons would lead to significant distortions of competition. In any case, these
bodies shall be considered taxable persons in relation to the activities listed in annex D,
provided they are not carried out on such a small scale as to be negligible.1
These activities are called non-taxable activities. However, as the second part of this
article describes, an exception to this general rule can be made in case the non-taxable
character of these activities could lead to significant distortions of competition.
The second exception is made for specific activities listed in Article 13 of the Sixth
VAT directive as for health, education and banking services (Genser and Winker,
1997). These activities are known as tax-exempt activities. This exception is relevant for
private and other public suppliers as well.
In case a public sector body performs taxable activities, the services are subject to VAT.
The local government carrying out this activity is entitled to recover the input VAT
acquired for the purposes of a VAT taxable activity. Since the municipality will be able
to recover any input VAT incurred relating to this activity, the VAT consequences will
                                                          
1 Dijk and Lubbers, 2000.
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not be a consideration when a municipality chooses between carrying out the activity
itself or contracting out services to the private sector.
In case a public sector body performs non-taxable or tax-exempt activities, these
activities are outside the scope of VAT. The municipality carrying out this kind of
activity will thus be unable to recover any input VAT related to this activity. The
respective VAT consequences will then become an important consideration when the
municipality chooses between carrying out the activity itself and contracting out the
activities to the private sector. If, for example, the private sector is able to perform
activities for an amount which is lower than the costs to the municipality in the case of
self-supply, the private sector could still be more expensive since the additional VAT
charged on the supplies from the private sector would increase the price by the relevant
VAT-rate (Dijk and Lubbers, 2000).
As a result, these VAT costs are a relevant aspect when a public sector body considers
the choice between carrying out the activity itself and contracting out the service to the
private sector. Therefore, for both non-taxable and tax-exempt activities, the present
VAT legislation disturbs the level playing field between the self-supply of services and
contracting out of governmental activities and causes significant economic distortions
(Aujean, Jenkins and Poddar, 1999; Gradus and Dijkgraaf, 1997). The last years, these
distortions may have increased because of the rise of the tax rates of VAT in some
European countries (for example in the Netherlands in 2001 the VAT rate is raised from
17,5 to 19 per cent).
There are two general options to solve this VAT distortion (Aujean, Jenkins and Poddar,
1999). The first option is the change of the European VAT legislation by widening the
application of the regular VAT regime to the non-taxable and the tax-exempt activities
as well. Then, the VAT input costs can be recovered and are not relevant in the
comparison between the self-supply of services and contracting out. However, such a
thorough change of the European VAT legislation is not to be expected for the next
years.
The second option is to finance the VAT costs of public sector bodies by a refund
outside the VAT regime. This non-fiscal, budgetary solution has as effect the creation of
a level playing field between the self-supply of services and contracting out (European
Commission, 2000). This system is or will be implemented in six European countries
(see table 2). The funding of the system differs for each of the schemes and a global
distinction can be made between open and closed models. Both models create a level-
playing field between the self-supply of services and contracting out. The two types of
models differ in the way they are funded for the extra costs of the scheme in case the
payments of the fund increase as a result of a growing level of outsourcing of public
sector bodies. In an open model, the extra costs are funded by the extra VAT receipts
for the central government. In a closed model, the public sector bodies themselves fund
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the extra costs. The choice for one of the models has only an effect on the budgetary
flows between central and local governments.
In some countries, the VAT distortion for public sector bodies is solved by using the
exceptive clause that in case considering the activity as a non-taxable activity would
lead to significant distortions of competition, the activity is considered to be taxable. As
shown in table 1 both Norway and Denmark have chosen this solution for mitigating the
VAT effects on the collection of household refuse.
4. VAT refund schemes in Europe
Six European countries have or will get a refund scheme for the VAT costs on non-
taxable or tax-exempt activities for local governments.2 In this paragraph, the main
characteristics are discussed.
The United Kingdom
The main reason for the introduction of the VAT refund scheme in the United Kingdom
simultaneous with the introduction of VAT in 1973 was to prevent VAT falling on the
activities of local governments funded by the local taxpayer. The VAT refund scheme is
part of the regular VAT legislation (sections 33 and 42 of VAT Act 1994) and only
applies to non-taxable activities carried out by local and police authorities.3,4
Compensation is not given for VAT incurred in other EU-member states and for certain
specified purchases as motorcars (HM Customs and Excise, 1997).
The scheme is fully financed by the central government by the VAT receipts. Increases
in payments of the scheme are therefore financed by higher VAT receipts as well. The
scheme costs about £3.3bn in 2001 (about 0,4 per cent of GDP). At the moment of
introduction of the refund scheme (1973), the concept of contracting out had not been
widely implemented. Consequently, there are no figures available about the effect of the
scheme on the level of contracting out. Furthermore, the imposition of Compulsory
Competitive Tendering by the central government in 1988 seems also important in
stimulating contracting out.
                                                          
2 In the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands specific regimes
for the VAT compensation on the level of central government exist as well. These
regimes deviate from the character of the funds for local authorities.
3 The scheme applies as well to organisations that have the power to raise revenue via the
council tax and perform activities that are the statutory responsibility of local authorities.
4 Compensation is given for tax-exempt activities as well in case their size remains below
5 per cent of the total VAT refund on non-taxable activities.
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Denmark
The reason for the introduction of the VAT compensation fund in 1985 was to ensure
equal competition between goods and services produced by the public sector and the
private sector. From 1970 to 1984 the Danish municipalities were imposed VAT on
their own production to ensure equal competition, but from 1985 the actual VAT
equalisation scheme was introduced as it was more simple to administrate. The scheme
includes municipal and county authorities and inter-authority companies. Compensation
is given for both VAT on non-taxable and tax-exempt activities. Only VAT paid to the
Danish government is refunded by the VAT compensation fund. The VAT costs for tax-
exempt activities that are supplied by a private enterprise are not recovered by the
regular refund rules. To prevent an unequal treatment of self-supply of tax-exempt
activities and outsourcing of these activities, a reimbursement – equal to a percentage of
the price – is given by the refund scheme as well. The VAT costs on the tax-exempt
activities are calculated by a fixed percentage for each relevant activity.
In Denmark, the VAT compensation fund is fully financed by the municipalities and
counties by an equalisation scheme. The inter-authority companies do not contribute to
the scheme. The costs are distributed among the counties and municipalities according
to their estimated income tax base. Higher refunds are financed by higher contributions
and are not funded by the central government. The fund costs about 13.5 bn DKK in
2001 (about 1,0 per cent of GDP). There are no data available about how the VAT
compensation fund influences the level of contracting out of activities. However, the
growth of the size of the local government VAT fund since 1993 has been interpreted
by the Danish government as a sign of a growing level of contracting out by local
governments.
Finland
The Finnish VAT refund scheme was introduced in 1994 simultaneously with the
introduction of VAT in Finland. The refund scheme turned out to be necessary because
services became taxable to a larger extent than in the previous consumption tax system.
The refund right covers the VAT on all non-taxable and tax-exempt activities of the
municipalities and the municipal federations that do not entitle to a right a deduction in
accordance with the normal VAT-system. Refund is not given for VAT paid to other
EU-countries and for the VAT costs on certain specified purchases.
The municipalities themselves finance the Finnish refund scheme. An increase in the
refund is paid by the municipalities as well. The financing share is determined on the
basis of their number of inhabitants. Because the share of the refunds to the
municipalities does not have a direct relation with the number of inhabitants of the
municipality redistribution effects are caused. The municipal federations receive
compensation, but do not contribute to the scheme. Both issues are part of a review of
the Finnish scheme.
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The fund costs about 5.2 bn Finnish marks in 2001 (about 0,6 per cent of GDP). The
total sum of the refunds paid to the municipalities and the municipal federations has
increased steadily during the application of the scheme. The impact of the refund in
comparison with other economic factors has not been examined. Therefore, conclusions
about the impact of the scheme on the level of contracting out by local governments are
not available.
Sweden
In 1995 the VAT refund scheme was introduced to remove the distortion between self-
supply and contracting out for municipalities and county councils. Before, Sweden was
not a member of the European Union and the general right of deduction for local
authorities was not in accordance with the European VAT directive. The distortionary
effect of VAT was solved by refunding all input VAT, regardless whether the activity
was taxable or not. The present system is based on the Danish VAT refund scheme. The
scheme applies to municipalities and county councils. Refund is given for both VAT on
non-taxable and tax-exempt activities. VAT paid in other member states and purchase
of passenger cars is excluded. There is also a compensation for hidden VAT when tax-
exempt services are procured from subcontractors, such as private hospitals and dentists
or when a tax-exempt activity is subsidized by the local authorities. Because of the tax-
exempt character of these activities, the input VAT costs are not a separate part of the
procurement price. Instead, a calculated flat rate of 5, 6 or 18 per cent of the price is
reimbursed in the system. This should correspond with the hidden VAT in the price of
the service.
In Sweden, the compensation fund is based on a principle of self-financing. The total
amount of refunds from the system must be paid back to the fund by the collective of
municipalities and county councils. The payment is the same amount per inhabitant in
each municipality or county. Furthermore, when the present system was introduced, the
general state subsidy to the local authorities was raised. This means that the state also
contributes with a fixed amount to the funding of the system. An increase in the refunds
is funded by the contributions of the municipalities and the provinces. The fund costs
about 27 bn SEK in 2001 (about 1,2 per cent of GDP). No information is available
about the effects of the refund scheme on the contracting out by municipalities and
county councils.
In 1999, a Swedish governmental committee presented a report on the functioning of
the compensation system and suggested a few changes (SOU, 1999). The Committee
found that one of the main problems of the compensation scheme appeared to be the
unequal treatment of non-governmental providers of tax-exempts as private schools and
private health clinics and comparable governmental bodies. The former complain
because they are not entitled to have the same kind of direct reimbursement of input
VAT as the governmental bodies have. Besides, the financing of the system has been
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too low which has created a deficiency of the fund and the reattribution of resources
(since the contribution is just dependent on the number of inhabitants).
Norway
In Norway, in 1995 the VAT refund-scheme was introduced to remove the distortion
between self-supply and contracting out as it might lead to a more perfect allocation of
resources. Local authorities can get a refund for VAT costs of some specified
governmental activities, restricted to tasks defined in the VAT compensation Act, as
building contractor services, engineering services, laundry services and services by
consultants. The fund costs about 1,2 bn NOK in 2001 (about 0,1 per cent of GDP).
Refund is given only for Norwegian VAT costs. The fund is financed by a reduction in
the general grant (about 80 per cent in 2000) en partly (about 20 per cent in 2000) by
higher VAT receipts as a consequence of increased contracting out. Higher refunds are
financed by the higher VAT receipts of the central government. The claims for VAT
refund have increased by 20 per cent (adjusted for inflation) in the period 1995 – 1999.
The increase in the share of the funding by VAT receipts is seen by the Norwegian
government as an indication of the growth of contracting out in Norway. By presenting
the National Budget 2001, the Norwegian government proposed a huge VAT reform
that may have consequences for the VAT refund scheme.
The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, a compensation fund is to be introduced in the year 2003 (Dijk and
Lubbers, 2000). The reason for the introduction is twofold. The main reason is the
creation of a level playing field between self-supply and contracting out. Besides, with
the introduction, the incentive for local authorities will disappear to start fiscal schemes
for avoiding the paying VAT. The scheme will apply to municipalities and provinces.
Compensation will be given for VAT costs on non-taxable activities, except the VAT
costs for aid in kind to other organisations. The compensation fund provides refunds for
both Dutch VAT as VAT from other countries from the European Union.5
The scheme will be funded by a structural reduction of the general grants for
municipalities and provinces equal to the value of compensation in the year of
introduction and will be completed by the addition of extra VAT receipts resulting from
the expected growth in contracting out. By the design of the grant-reduction, differences
in cost structure between municipalities and provinces will be taken into account.
Therefore, the fund will not lead to a significant redistribution of funds between
individual municipalities and provinces. At this moment no expectations about the size
and the efficiency gains of the introduction of the fund are available.
                                                          
5 Due to legal reasons, compensation is given for VAT from the ESA-states Norway,
Liechtenstein and Iceland as well.
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5. Overview
In this section an overview of the different schemes to solve the VAT distortion used in
different countries will be given. Table 2 shows the main characteristics of the models
described in this paper.
Table 2 VAT refund schemes in Europe
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United Kingdom 30 open all none1 no 0,4 1973
Denmark 85 closed all all no 1,0 1985
Finland 92 closed all all no 0,6 1994
Sweden 63 closed all all no 1,2 1995
Norway 73 open some2 none no 0,1 1995
The Netherlands 40 open all none yes - 2003
1. Compensation is given for tax-exempt activities in case their size remain below 5
per cent of the expenditures of the public body.
2. Compensation is restricted to contractor, engineering, laundry, and consultancy
services.
Contracting out refuse collection
Table 1 shows that European countries differ in the level of contracting out of the refuse
collection and that the percentage outdoors refuse collection in the countries having a
level playing field at the household refuse collection. Comparing these figures with
countries without such a level playing field (Ireland, 39 per cent, the Netherlands, 40
per cent, Italy 46 per cent) we conclude that having a level playing field stimulates the
outdoors refuse collection by local authorities. In three countries, the level playing field
is realised by the introduction of a VAT refund scheme for non-taxable activities. In
Denmark and Norway, the choice is made to consider the collection of household refuse
to be a taxable activity. The present Dutch fiscal system is a disincentive for contracting
out.
In spite of the VAT compensation, in the UK the method of contracting refuse
collection is beyond less popular than in-house provision (see table 2). It should be
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noticed that the data for the UK are of earlier date (1984 – 1994) (e.g. Szymanski,
1996). Moreover, political patronage seems more important in the British government
than in the other countries (Painter, 1991) and competition may not be intensive in the
United Kingdom (Gómez-Lobo and Szymanski, 2001)). In other countries measures
have been taken to enhance the likelihood that several firms will be in a position to
compete when the time comes for re-tendering. For example, in Denmark Odense split
its geographical area into four parts and invited separate tenders for each of the four
regions and in Sweden Uppsala divided its area into sub-regions and organised tenders
for each region sequentially with one tender coming up for renewal each year (OECD,
2000, p. 35).
In a similar study Dijkgraaf, Gradus and Melenberg (1999) examined for the
Netherlands the determinants of the provision mode of refuse collection. They found
evidence for political patronage and the wealthy of the local government as a ground for
contracting out, but also the possible efficiency gain of contracting out plays a role.
Dutch municipalities put more weight on efficiency-ground and therefore the
introduction of the VAT compensation fund in 2003 will certainly stimulate contracting
out of refuse collection on other local governments activities.
Open vs. closed models
The VAT refund schemes differ in the way the extra costs for the fund are financed.
Open and closed models are distinguished. In a closed model, higher refunds are
financed by a higher contribution to the scheme, and therefore have a negative
budgetary effect on each of the individual bodies. The benefits of the scheme for an
individual public sector body therefore depend on the efficiency gains that it may realise
by contracting out, and the losses made by the contribution to the scheme to pay the
refunds for other bodies. In case these benefits are negative, the public sector body has
to increase its tax rates to meet these costs. Therefore, this model is only applicable in
case the public sector bodies are able to pass the extra expenses by increasing their tax
rates. In this model, the central government has a profit equal to the extra VAT receipts.
In an open model, higher refunds to all public bodies are financed by the higher tax
receipts of the central government which are added to the fund. The individual local
government is able to generate the efficiency gains by contracting out, without the side-
effect of higher contributions to the scheme.
The United Kingdom, Norway and the Netherlands have an open model for the
compensation of VAT costs. An increase in contracting out of local authorities leads to
a payment of the central government to finance the higher VAT costs.
The refund schemes in Denmark, Finland and Sweden are closed. Higher refunds of the
scheme are financed by the local authorities themselves and will lead to higher local
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taxes.6 Therefore, it may have consequences on the opinion of the local authorities
about the scheme (SOU, 1999).
Non-taxable and tax-exempt activities
In the United Kingdom, Norway and the Netherlands refund is given only for VAT
costs on non-taxable activities.7 In Sweden, Denmark en Finland refund is given for tax-
exempt activities as well. This choice might be related to the difference in the scope of
activities of local governments in these countries. In the UK as well as the Netherlands
health care and education – the most relevant tax-exempt activities - are provided by the
private sector as well. A VAT refund scheme for public sector bodies including these
activities might therefore lead to an unequal treatment between private and public
suppliers. As a result, in Sweden non-governmental providers of tax-exempts as private
schools and private health clinics complain because they are not entitled to have the
same kind of direct reimbursement if input VAT as well as the comparable
governmental bodies have (SOU 1999). In Norway and Denmark, the refund is
restricted to certain specified non-taxable activities.
In table 2, a relation is shown up between the choice for the compensation of VAT on
tax-exempt activities and the choice for a closed model. This can be explained by the
text of article 17 of the Sixth VAT-directive. This article states that the full refund of
VAT is excluded for tax-exempt activities (Terra and Kajus, 1991). In a closed model,
not a pure refund is given, but more a redistribution of means (European Commission,
2000). Therefore, by the choice for a closed model, it is with respect to the text of
article 17, possible to generate a level playing field for tax-exempt activities as well.
As far as tax-exempt activities are performed by private suppliers, no compensation of
VAT costs is given. This may still lead to significant efficiency losses as decision-
making of these suppliers also is distorted by the effect of VAT.
Non-national VAT
Only in the Netherlands, the planned refund scheme allows a refund of non-national
VAT costs. For this part of the Dutch system, the model is closed. The local
governments themselves pay the higher costs of this part of the refund. The choice of
other countries to restrict the refund to national VAT costs might be in contrary with the
European common market rules. As a consequence of this exception, the costs for
                                                          
6 In Denmark, the expenditures of local authorities and counties to the VAT compensation
fund are part of the general estimates of the economic outlook for the next year when
local authorities and counties negotiate with the central government on the average tax
level for both local authorities and counties for the next year. So rising VAT costs are not
directly being compensated, but they are taken into consideration in general negotiations.
7 In the United Kingdom compensation is given for tax-exempt activities as well as in case
their size remain below 5 per cent of the expenditures of the public body.
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national supplies are lower than those of non-national suppliers and the level playing
field is restricted to the national market.
Efficiency gains
At this moment, no founded information is available about the efficiency gains that are
consequence of the introduction of the different refund schemes. For the United
Kingdom and Finland, the schemes were simultaneously introduced with the
introduction of VAT. For the Netherlands the scheme is to be introduced in 2003. Only
for Denmark, Sweden and Norway indications are available that after the introduction
of the scheme the outsourcing of local governments has increased. This might be
explained by the introduction of the refund schemes.
6. Conclusion
The levying of VAT in Europe on public sector bodies and suppliers of tax-exempt
activities significantly disturbs the decision-making of these actors in their choice
between public provision and contracting out of services. A refund scheme for local
governments – as used in several European countries – is a sufficient solution to this
distortion.
The introduction of VAT refund schemes stimulates the contracting out by local
governments and therefore a more efficient government. In European countries with a
refund scheme for the VAT costs of local governments, out of doors refuse collection is
relatively high compared to countries without. In Denmark and Norway a level playing
field is created by considering refuse collection as a taxable activity.
An important aspect is in what way the extra costs of the refund are financed. A closed
scheme – financed just by the local governments themselves will lead to an increase of
local tax rates and windfalls for the central government. Due to the fact that in a closed
system no pure refund is given it is possible to include tax-exempt activities in the fund
as well. However, this gives raise to new distortions in mixed sectors with public and
private suppliers.
The distortion in decision-making as an effect of the levying of VAT is still relevant for
private suppliers of tax-exempt activities and in some countries for public suppliers as
well. This may lead to significant efficiency losses in economic sectors as health care
and education. Only at the EU-level these distortions can be solved.
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